the limping messenger

DRONE-TERRORISM

– still exclusively a form of ‘state-terrorism’ but not for long, non-state actors will acquire the ability and tools in the near future. I have chosen 15 long quotations from a recent academic study on the subject: Koch, Bettina. 2016. State Terror, State Violence: Global Perspectives. `They are not rendered to an easy format as in journalistic products, but for those who take their time and chew on these citations from one chapter of the book, it will help them to start thinking about how language eases the way for politicians and military to commit war crimes in the name of peace and democracy.

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“As Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig (2012, p. 370, p. 372) argue, the use of “killer drones” is particular attractive for democratic regimes: drones promise “casualty aversion,” avoid a “public-opinion backlash” (no boots on the ground), and, more generally, they “appeal to the utilitarian and normative characteristic of democracies.” Yet, as a response, the strategy of drone strikes “may invite guerilla warfare or even terrorist attacks as a response to their overwhelming conventional superiority,” which suggests that a military strategy involving drone strikes might create what is claims to defeat (see also Campos and Gassebner 2013). “

[Koch, Bettina. 2016. State Terror, State Violence: Global Perspectives. ; p. 152. ]

“The second challenge is more specific: As it is commonly understood, one of the key issues about state terrorism is the simple fact that the state targets the very people it ought to protect. In the case of extraterritorial targeted killings through drone strikes, the first challenge seems to have disappeared. Instead, questions of national territorial sovereignty but also of a national government’s complicity in a foreign nation’s actions emerge.4 Michael J. Boyle (2013, p. 15) even implies that extraterritorial (violent) actions by other governments “provide a powerful signal to the population of a targeted state that the perpetrator considers the sovereignty of their government to be negligible.” Yet, the latter issue relates back to the first challenge, while the question of territorial sovereignty becomes even messier as soon as foreign fighters are involved (cf. Bryan 2010).5” [Ibid.; p. 153.]

“The White Paper states that the U.S. is not at war with a foreign nation. Instead, the U.S. claims to be in “a non-international armed conflict in which one of the par- ties is a transnational, non-state actor and where the principal theater of operation is not within the territory of the nation that is a party in the conflict” (DoJ White Paper 2011, p. 4). Moreover, it compares the case to domestic law in which a police officer can also use lethal force in self-defense or in defense of others (DoJ White Paper 2011, p. 9). According to the White Paper, a threat remains imminent unless it is evident that the person associated with the treat “has renounced or abandoned such activities” (DoJ White Paper 2011, p. 8).” [Ibid.; p. 155.]

“A similar confusion is evident in the discourse whether drones, used in response to “international terrorism” are a just weapon, compared to other weapons tra- ditionally used in warfare, and, thus, locate the targeted killing with drones as a problem of ius in bello. As Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun (2011, p. 344) note, they are only weapons of war in the context of warfare. Outside warzones, drones are weapons used to cause “acts of violence,” but not “acts of war.” Thus, both acts and means depend on the circumstances in which they occur and for the purposes they are used. In warfare, drones may be used for justified and legal actions as much as they may be used for unjustifiable and illegal action. Unless a particular weapon as, for instance, lethal gas or cluster bombs,6 is internationally condemned, the weapon itself is neither just nor unjust.” [Ibid.; p. 158.]

“From the perspective of how a particular weapon can be potentially used, David Hastings Dunn (2013, p. 1244) considers drones as the almost perfect weapon for terrorist attacks: They can be operated anonymously and remotely; they present little or no risk to their operators; they can be acquired cheaply and easily; their operation can be mastered simply and safely; and they can be used in isolation or in large numbers (given their availability and cost) to devastating effect.” [Ibid.; p. 158.]

“3.1 Preemptive Self-Defense The argument of the legality of the U.S. drones strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistan (but also in Yemen, Syria, or Somalia) focus particularly on the notion of preemp- tive self-defense. Yet, the very argument and construct of preemptive self-defense is in the center of critique. The fundamental logic behind the concept of preemp- tive self-defense, although frequently associated with the U.S., South Africa, and Israel (Höfer 2013, p. 94), is a justification of old. For instance, Humbert of Ro- mans in his Opus tripartium, c. 1272–1274, applies a similar logic in defense of the Crusades and the killing of Muslims in the Holy Land (in Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981, pp. 103–117; see also Koch 2015). Ironically, the rhetoric of the Crusades has also been utilized in the “international war on terrorism” (Lusthaus 2011, pp. 6–8).” [Ibid.; p. 159.]

“Although defenders of the drone-strikes strategy usually highlight the humanity of the drone attacks because of their relatively low number of casualties compared to traditional warfare, the proportionality, particularly in relation to the wrong the U.S. have suffered, has been questioned (Shah 2010, p. 125; Ahmad 2014).” [Ibid.; p. 159.]

“More significant than arguments based on international law are concerns re- garding the international and long term consequences of a new doctrine of pre- emptive self-defense that allows one state to target “enemies” in another state’s territory. The strategy would also allow for the oppression of local movements of independence (Gray 2002). This concern is also shared by Peter Bergen and Jennifer Rowland (2013, p. 8) who suggest that the “deployment of CIA drones to target militants could also provide some unwelcome precedents for countries such as China, Russia, and Iran as they develop the capacity to target with drones those individuals that they regard as terrorists.” Moreover, Michael J. Boyle (2013, p. 3) argues that “drone strikes corrode the stability and legitimacy of local gov- ernments, deepen anti-American sentiments and create new recruits for Islamist networks aiming to overthrow these governments.” In addition, “[s]tates with re- curring separatist or insurgent problems may begin to police their restive territories through drone strikes, essentially containing the problem in a fixed geographical region and engaging in a largely punitive policy against them” (Boyle 2013, p. 26). Stewart Casey-Maslen (2014, p. 290) concludes, [w]hat the USA may in fact be doing is—implicitly—seeking to introduce the inter- national law of law enforcement requirement of imminence for the lawful use of international lethal force into a scenario that it has already classified as an armed conflict […]. If that is indeed what it is doing, it mangles the law. Michael J. Boyle goes even one step further when he concludes that “the US will have normalized murder as a tool of statecraft and created a world where states can increasingly take revenge on individuals outside their borders without the niceties of extradition, due process or trial” (Boyle 2013, p. 25). If these concerns are only partly true, the proportionality of drone strikes, par- ticularly if one considers long-term consequences, is even more doubtful, although states that uses drone strikes in response to one particular problem, certainly deny responsibility for the long-term consequences of the strategy.” [Ibid.; p. 160.]

“As documented substantially by the Stanford Law School’s Living under Drones project (2012), the problem with reliable data does not only concern the number of the total casualties, it also concerns the question who may and who may not qualify as civilian victim. Depending on (political) interests, the number of civilian victims vary from up to 50 civilian casualties for one killed “terrorist” to the absence of civil victims ( Muslims Today, 22.05.2013; Ahmad 2014, p. 71). Ac- cording to U.S. opinion, it is sufficient to sojourn near an identified “terrorist” or to be a male adult who resides in a certain territory to qualify as a legitimate target ( Huffington Post, 29.05.2014). The later definition relates to the strategy of signature strikes. Contrary to so- called individual strikes that target known individuals, signature strikes aim at tar- geting individuals or groups of people based on undisclosed behavior patterns. Particularly in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in the Afghani- stan-Pakistan borderland, jirgas (traditional assemblies of tribal leaders) but also funerals and weddings have become targets of signature strikes (International Cri- sis Group 2013, p. 11). Whereas the individual strikes are already problematic, Kevin Jon Heller’s (2013) analysis shows how the signature strikes involve substantial violation of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL). Heller outlines that particularly four signatures can never be legally justi- fied under IHL: “(a) Military-age male in area of known terrorist activity,” “(b) ‘Consorting with known militants’,” “(c) Armed men travelling in trucks in Al- Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula-controlled area,” and “(d) ‘Suspicious’ camp in AQ [Al-Qaeda]-controlled area” (Heller 2013, pp. 97–99). Although some signa- tures may be legal under International Humanitarian Law, they nonetheless violate International Human Rights Law. Particularly targeting and killing people who are “‘facilitating’ AQ; being present in an AQ compound; and operating an AQ train- ing camp” may constitute crimes against humanity (Heller 2013, p. 117). Thus, one of the main reason for U.S. drone strikes in the region, namely that Taliban and other local groups harbor al-Qaeda fighters (Tarzi 2012, p. 17), does not justify the actions taken by the U.S.” [Ibid.; p. 161.]

“Whereas it is already difficult to imagine how a drug dealer in Afghanistan or Pakistan can cause an imminent threat to the U.S.—the U.S. logic is based on the assumption that drug dealers aid the militants financially—, it is also doubt- ful whether Taliban fighters are likely to plan and undertake an attack against the U.S. on U.S soil. In this context it is of significance to ask who the Taliban actu- ally are and how they fit into the traditional tribal system of the FATA. The U.S. policy in the region is based on the assumption of a predominantly tribal culture. Yet, Shahzad Bashir and Robert D. Crews find it even “paradoxical” that “military planners and their civilian advisors seized upon the idea of tribe as the essential key to Afghan and Pakistani identities at a time when the concept had long been aban- doned by most anthropologists and scholars in related fields” (Bashir and Crews 2012, p. 3). Particularly since the Soviet invasion of the 1970s the existing tribal structures have been undermined; the invasion also caused an increased Islamiza- tion in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (Tarzi 2012, p. 19; Haroon 2012, p. 58).7 Partly, the rise of jihadist movements and the emergence of leaders who based their authority rather on religion than on tribal structures can be seen as an outcome of Pakistan’s politics that aimed at gaining more political and economic influence in Central Asia. Initially, Pakistani Taliban movements that crosses the border to Afghanistan did so with explicit and direct support from Pakistan’s military. “In addition, the Pakistani jihadist movements, largely born from the Kashmir policy of Pakistan, had a sanctuary in the border areas” (Dorronsoro 2012, p. 34).” [Ibid.; p. 162.]

“Despite the fact that the Afghan Taliban’s agenda is exclusively Afghan and there- fore nationalist and local, the U.S. response to the Taliban, including attempts to target Taliban leaders, imply that the Taliban are suspected of plotting terrorist attacks against the U.S. Because the Taliban still operate within a culture of tribal identities and because after 2001 tribal communities were “unable to protect the returnees [from combat] against arrest and being killed,” the “key support for the Taliban comes from communities who have prisoners in the Guantanamo system” (Ruttig 2012, pp. 110–111). Thus, targeting Taliban with drone strikes and other means seems to be at best counter-productive.” [Ibid.; p. 163.]

“Because the key element of terrorism is to terrorize, it is necessary to explore how the drone strikes affect the general population in the tribal regions of the Afghani- stan-Pakistan borderlands. According to some calculations, in 2008 “armed drones flew over Iraq and Afghanistan for 135,000 h (equivalent to 15 years of flight) and dropped 187 missiles and bombs” (Shaw and Akhter 2011, p. 1492). Drone attacks have been described as “lightening [that] comes down in the form of Hellfire” (Shaw and Akhter 2011, p. 1502). Because fear depends on perception, it is useful to outline some personal accounts from people who are living in areas frequently targeted by drone strikes. The following examples are taken from the Living under Drones project (2012):” [Ibid.; p. 163.]

“The drones were terrifying. From the ground, it is impossible to determine who or what they are tracking as they circle overhead. The buzz of a distant propeller is a constant reminder of imminent death (David Rohde, U.S. journalist on his experience while in Taliban captivity). We are always thinking that it is either going to attack our homes or whatever we do. It’s going to strike us; it’s going to attack us […]. No matter what we are doing, that fear is always inculcated in us. Because whether we are driving a car, or we are work- ing on a farm, or we are sitting home playing […] cards–no matter what we are doing we are always thinking the drone will strike us. So we are scared to do anything, no matter what (Haroon Quddoos, taxi driver). When [children] hear the drones, they get really scared, and they can hear them all the time so they’re always fearful that the drone is going to attack them […]. [B]ecause of the noise, we’re psychologically disturbed—women, men, and children […]. Twenty- four hours, [a] person is in stress and there is pain in his head (Hisham Abrar). ” [Ibid.; p. 164.]

“Psychologically, the exposure to the (constant) threat of drone strikes causes “sub- stantial levels of fear and stress,” a feeling of powerlessness, anxiety, but also “an- ticipatory anxiety” (when is the next drone strike to happen?). In short, many of the interviewed persons showed severe symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Some persons even showed symptoms at a level that made them unfit to work, which implies, in addition to the psychological effects, economic and social consequences (Ahmed 2013, pp. 83–84). In addition to the obvious impact on life and property, the drone strikes also cause changes in social and communal behavior. One social effect is the direct consequence of the U.S. strategy of the so- called “double top” strikes. Central to the strategy is to strike a second time soon after the first strike has occurred. As a consequence, the double top strikes “have increased civilian casualties, as families of the victims and emergency services are now reluctant to come to aid of those injured for fear that they will fall victim to a follow-on attack” (Boyle 2013, p. 8). The increased number of victims is one part of the effect; the other part involved a change in social behavior. Where, under normal circumstances, family members, neighbors, and first aid workers would come to rescue the injured, they are now reluctant doing so out of fear of falling victim to a second strike. Another consequence concerns the ability of local and regional self-organiza- tion and self-government. As indicated earlier, the traditional conflict-resolution institution, the tribal jirga has been weakened through a growing conflict over authority and legitimacy between the traditional elders and religious authorities. After tribal jirgas have been targeted by signature strikes, the traditional instru- ment of local governance and conflict resolution has become even further weak- ened. In 2011, a jirga that was held in Datta Khel, North Waziristan, was hit by a drone strike; 40 men were killed; only four of the victims were believed to be militants. (International Crisis Group 2013, p. 11). In the aftermath of the strike, elders have become far more reluctant to gather for a jirga or other cultural ac- tivities. Because FATA is governed under FCR (Frontier Crimes Regulations), “it has no police forces; instead, paramilitary, military, and tribal militia forces keep order” (Fair et al. 2014, p. 9). Thus, by targeting jirgas, a genuine political element of self-governance is lost; only relatively unregulated military and paramilitary units remain to keep order. Similar changes in social and cultural behavior occur in regions in which weddings or funerals were targeted by signature strikes. To avoid being targeted at similar occasions in the future, “communities have even become reluctant to hold funerals lest they attract drone strikes” (International Crisis Group 2013, p. 12). Yet, these are not the only consequences caused by the drone strike strategy: first, the drone strikes caused “a backlash of anti-Americanism” and, second, “Is- lamist parties have used the drone strikes to mobilize thousands of followers” (Wil- liams 2010, p. 872, 881).” [Ibid.; p. 164.]

“If the drone strikes do not qualify as a form of coercion, then they must be a form of violence and, thus, are illegal by nature. But is the violence terroristic? The examples on the psychological effects on people living under the permanent threat of drone strikes certainly indicated that the drone strikes strategy is able to create fear and anxiety. Thus, at least for the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands, it can be assumed, if terrorizing was the desired means to a political end, the means have succeeded. Because the drone strike strategy did not instantly come to an end after the psychological effects were publically known, it seems appropriate to as- sume that the terrorizing effects have been at least tacitly approved if not actively wanted. A rather different question remains how successful the strategy of terrorizing actually is. Whereas there seems to be sufficient evidence that, in addition to the psychological effects on the population that is directly threatened by drones, the strategy triggers further radicalization of people in the region, without having a direct effect on other regions in Pakistan or Afghanistan that do not live under drones. To end as we began with the young Yemini activist Farea al-Muslimi: “What radicals had previously failed to achieve in my village, one drone strike accomplished in an instant: There is now an intense anger and growing hatred of America” (cited in Bergen and Rowland 2013, p. 18). Thus, what the drone strikes strategy seems to have achieved in addition to terrorizing the people living in tar- geted regions, is an increase of violence.” [Ibid.; p. 166.]